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In the Supreme Court
of the

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 8537

JOHN F. LEDKINS
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant and appellant herein, John F. Ledkins,
hereinafter referred to as defendant, was originally charged
with KNOWINGLY VIOLATING RULES AND REGULATIONS WHILE A GUARD AT THE UTAH STATE
PRISON (R. 2 & 7). Later at the preliminary hearing stage,
a second count was added charging the defendant with ATTEMPTING TO SUPPLY DRUGS TO AN INMATE (R.
2 & 7). On Motion of the State, the first count was dismissed

3
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(R. 3). After oral argument to the comrruttlng magistrate,
Judge Leland Larsen, concerning the validity of the statutes
in question, the defendant was bound over to the District
Court on the second count.
The District Attorney filed an Information charging the
defendant of KNOWINGLY VIOLATING RULES AND
REGULATIONS WHILE A GUARD AT THE UTAH
STATE PRISON by wilfully, knowingly attempt to supply
drugs to an inmate (R. 8). At time of arraignment, the defendant filed a Demand for Bill of Particulars, Motion to
Quash and Motion to Dismiss (R. 14-21). A Bill of Particulars was furnished the defendant by the District Attorney
(R. 11 & 13).
A date was set for the argument of defendant's Motion
to Quash and Motion to Dismiss, and on said day the said
Motions were duly argued and submitted to the Court (R. 2547). At that time the District Attorney dismissed the count of
KNOWINGLY VIOLATING RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHILE A GUARD AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON
(R. 26). Upon leave of Court, the District Attorney was granted permission to amend the Information (R. 22 & 26).
Upon completion of oral argument, the Court permitted
defendant to file a Brief on the following question: Does partial invalidity of a criminal statute invalidate the whole statute,
or may the Court eliminate those provisions of the section
which are unconstitutional and leave standing that portion of
a section which would have been constitutional? (R. 22 &
44-47).
4
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Defendant submitted a written Brief (not included in the
record). The Court denied defendant's Motions (R. 23) and
defendant was granted time in which to file an appeal to the
Supreme Court.
The defendant is presently charged in the Amended Information of the crime of ATTEMPTING TO GIVE OR
SELL A DRUG TO AN INMATE OF THE UTAH STATE
PRISON, WHILE A GUARD, in violation of Title 64, Chapter
9, Sections 41 and 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (R. 24).
Defendant filed a Petition for Intermediate Appeal, together with a Memorandum supporting said Petition (R.
59-66). On the 29th day of May, 1956, the Supreme Court
granted an Interlocutory Appeal (R. 68). This case now has
been continued without date pending determination of appeal
(R. 79).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I
THAT THE COURT TRYING THE CAUSE HAS NO
JURISDICTION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR OF
THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE
STATUTES UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS
CHARGED ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
THAT THEY ARE VAGUE, INDEFINITE, UNCERTAIN,
AMBIGUOUS AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER
SECTIONS OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
APPLICABLE TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON, AND IS

5
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AN IMPROPER DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION I, ARTICLE
V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

POINT NO. II
DOES PARTIAL INVALIDITY OF A CRIMINAL
STATUTE INVALIDATE THE WHOLE STATUTE, OR
MAY THE COURT ELIMINATE THOSE PROVISIONS
OF THE SECTION WHICH ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND LEAVE STANDING THAT PORTION OF A SECTION WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTITUTIONAL
IF ENACTED ALONE?

POINT NO. III
THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A PRELIMINARY-HEARING AS REQUIRED BY LAW IN THAT
HE WAS NOT BOUND OVER ON THE CHARGE OF
ATTEMPTING TO GIVE OR SELL A DRUG TO AN INMATE OF THE STATE PRISON, WHILE A GUARD.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THAT THE COURT TRYING THE CAUSE HAS NO
JURISDICTION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR OF
THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE
STATUTES UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS
6
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CHARGED ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
THAT THEY ARE VAGUE, INDEFINITE, UNCERTAIN,
AMBIGUOUS AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER
SECTIONS OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
APPLICABLE TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON, AND IS
AN IMPROPER DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION I, ARTICLE
V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
The statutes under which the defendant is charged are as
follows:
"64-9-38. Duties of guards and keepers-Penalty for
breach.-The guards, keepers and employees of the
state prison must be ready at all times to attend to any
duty required of them by the warden. The several
keepers and guards are hereby expressly charged with
all the duties and responsibilities of jailers. Any guard,
keeper or other employee of the state prison who knowingly violates any rule or regulation adopted by the
board, or who violates any of the provisions of this
chapter, or who neglects to perform the duties required
of him by the rules and regulations of the prison or
by the provisions of this chapter, is guilty of a felony,
and may be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000
or by imprisonment in the state prison for a period not
exceeding three years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
"64-9-41. Use of liquors and drugs forbidden.-No
spiritous or fermented liquor, drug, medicine or poison
shall, on any pretense whatever, be sold or given away
in the prison or in any building appurtenant thereto,
or on the land granted to the state for the use and
benefit of the prison; and no such drug or medicine
shall be given to, or suffered to be used by, any con7
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viet in the prison unless he is ill, and then only under
under the special direction of the prison physician."
Both of these statutes are challenged as to their validity
on constitutional grounds for many different reasons and each
of the statutes will be discussed separately for the purpose
of clarity. The first section cited will be referred to hereinafter
as the "section dealing with the duties of guards and keepers."
The second section cited will be referred to hereinafter as the
"section dealing with the use of drugs."
I

The constitutionality of the section dealing with the duties
of guards and keepers is challenged upon the following
grounds, anyone of which is sufficient to declare the section
void:
1. It is vague and ambiguous,

2. It is indefinite,

3. It is uncertain,
4. It is inconsistent with other sections of the Utah Code
applicable to the Utah State Prison, and
5. It is an improper delegation of legislative powers.
This section begins ·'The guards, keepers and employees
of the state prison must be ready at all times to attend to any
duty required of them by the warden." There is no dear
definition or limitation of the duties required, but, on the
contrary, speaks of any duty required by the warden. Under
this provision, the warden is the sovereign himself. Persons
at the prison must perform their activities at the peril of committing a felony. It is a delegation of power by the legislature
8
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of powers unheard of in the annals of law. A guard could be
subjected to a felony prosecution for failure to arrive at work
on time if he were ill or unavoidably detained. Said guard
could conceivably be subjected to a felony for engaging in an
exciting conversation while on duty. Such a provision violates
all of the requirements of valid legislation.
This section proceeds as follows: ''The several keepers
and guards are hereby expressly charged with all the duties
and responsibilities of jailers." The legislature has failed to
spell out with any certainty what the duties and responsibilities
of jailers are. Men of common intelligence must guess at its
meaning at their peril of a felony prosecution and will differ
as to its application and meaning.
The next sentence of this section is long and contains
various phrases, including the punishment for violation. It
begins: "Any guard, keeper or other employee of the state
prison who knowingly violates any rule or regulation adopted
by the board ... ". This phrase is another improper delegation
by the legislature of its power to determine what acts constitute a felony. A few examples from the "Rules and Regulations Governing Officers of the Utah State Prison" offered
into evidence by the State as Exhibit "A" at the preliminary
hearing will clearly emphasize the challenges made to this
section (R. 84). Paragraph 3 of said Rules provides as follows:
"COURTESY. Courtesy is demanded at all times and
fellow officers should be treated with mutual respect
and kindness. The discussion of controversial subjects
shall be avoided at all times. The conduct of an officer
of the institution should be that of a gentleman at all
times and under all conditions."
9
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Paragraph 4 of said Rules provides as follows:
"SMOKING ON DUTY. Smoking while on duty is
prohibited, except in properly designated areas. No
officer will attempt to carry on a conversation or meet
a fellow-officer or visitor with a cigarette, cigar or pipe
in his mouth; nor will he fail to remove his cap when
introduced to ladies; or upon entering the office of a
superior."
Paragraph 5 of said Rules provides as follows:
"PROPER CONDUCT ON DUTY. All officers shall,
while within the prison, refrain from whistling,
scuffling, immoderate laughter, boisterous conversation, exciting discussions, and all other acts which
might tend to disturb the harmony and good order of
the institution."
Paragraph 38 of said Rules provides as follows:
"PARKING FACILITIES. Parking facilities are furnished for automobiles. The keys to all cars shall be
removed and the doors to cars shall be kept locked at
all times."
·
A cursory examination by the Court of said Rules and
Regulations will clearly show the dangerous results to be had
if they were held to be a proper delegation of legislative
powers.
The next phrase of this section provides as follows: "or
who violates any of the provisions of this chapter, . . . ". A
thorough reading of the entire chapter will reveal that most
sections deal with the administration of the prison, such as
residence of warden, members and powers of the board of
corrections, bonds required, keeping of journals and records
10
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of the prison, appointment of parole agents, finances of prison,
duties of clerk and prison physician, meetings, visitors, library,
labeling of goods made by the prisoners and various other
matters. Most of the sections are vague, administrative and
are not criminal in nature with discretion left to the board of
corrections and warden to prescribe methods of application.
The enforcement of this section would place the burden of
perfection upon all persons connected with the prison and
would continually subject them to a felony prosecution. The
legislature certainly did not intend to make every infraction
of these various sections in the chapter to be a felony and
eliminate any discretion by the board or warden to otherwise
discipline the employees.
This sentence continues as follows: "or who neglects to
perform the duties required of him by the rules and regulations
of the prison or by the provisions of this chapter, is guilty of a
felony, ... ". This phrase makes pure negligence or neglect
an act constituting a felony. Under such a provision, a guard
who neglects to lock his car when he parks it in the parking
lot would be guilty of a felony.
This sentence and the balance of the section proceeds to
set forth the penalty for any breach of this section. The penalty
for breach itself is inconsistent with the other provisions in
this chapter as to enforcement of the various sections of the
chapter. The second paragraph of Title 64-9-2, Utah Code
Annotated, 195 3, provides as follows:
"The board of corrections is empowered and directed, among other things, . . . to make and enforce
all such general rules for the government and discipline
,1
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of the prison, as it may deem expedient, and from time
to time to change and amend the same; . . . ''
Title 64-9-13 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pertaining to
the general duties of the warden provide as follows:
"It shall be the duty of the warden under the rules
and regulations adopted by the board for the government of the prison: ( 2) To give necessary directions to
all inferior officers, keepers and guards, and to ascertain whether they have been careful and vigilant in
their respective duties."
Title 64-9-64, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, also provides as
follows:
"Any person, firm, or corporation, which violates any
of the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.''
Such provisions as to enforcement and penalty of a violation of the sections of this chapter are inconsistent with each
other and create an ambiguity and uncertainty and are not susceptible of uniform interpretation and application by those
charged with the responsibility of applying and enforcing
the provisions .of this chapter. These provisions permit an
administrative agency, an employee of the state, or the law
enforcement branch of the state, the right and discretion to
determine what are the violations of the various sections in
this title and whether violators should be merely disciplined,
charged with a felony, or charged with a misdemeanor.
The section dealing with the use of drugs is challenged
upon the following grounds:
12
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1. It is vague and ambiguous,

2. It is uncertain, and

3. It is indefinite.
This section consists of one sentence containing two ( 2)
separate clauses separated by a semi-colon. The .first phrase
reads as follows: "No spirituous or fermented liquor, drug,
medicine or poison shall, on any pretense whatever, be sold
or given away in the prison or in any building appurtenant
thereto, or on the land granted to the state for the use and
benefit of the prison; ... ". This clause is vague, ambiguous,
uncertain and indefinite in meaning. What is meant by sold
or given away? Does it mean that no liquor, drug, medicine
or poison can be brought on the prison at all ? If such items
are brought on to the prison property, then how are they placed
in the hands of the persons to use them? How can the necessary
insect eradication at the prison be carried out and how can
the fruit trees be sprayed with insecticides? Is it a felony to
have a Coca Cola dispensing machine in the entrance lobby of
the prison for the use of prison employees and visitors? Just
what is the legislature intending to prohibit, and whom is the
legislature intending to punish? It is stated at 22 C.J.S. at page
71 and 72 as follows:
"In creating an offense which was not a crime at
common law, a statute must, of course, be sufficiently
certain to show what the legislature intended to prohibit and punish, otherwise it will be void for uncertainty ... "
The second clause of this section reads as follows: "and
no such drug or medicine shall be given to, or suffered to be

13
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used by, any convict in the prison unless he is ill, and then only
under the special direction of the prison physican." This clause
for some reason leaves out the items of liquor and poison and
does not provide for the use of such items. The entire section
does not authorize the use of any drugs or medicines by anyone
else except the convicts. This clause is also vague, ambiguous,
uncertain and indefinite of meaning even when read with the
preceding clause. Would a guard be guilty of a felony if he
carried a box of aspirins on the prison property and gave one
to a fellow guard who had a headache? What offense do the
dispensary personnel commit when they dispense drugs in the
absence of the prison physican?
Perhaps the best example of how uncertain of interpretation this section is, is to read paragraph 11 of the Rules and
Regulations Governing Officers of Utah State Prison offered
into evidence as Exhibit "A" by the State. This regulation reads
as follows:
"SEDATIVES, NARCOTICS OR POISONS. At no
time shall sedatives, narcotics or poisons be permitted
to fall into the hands of inmates; nor shall such items
be permitted on assignments where food is being
handled or stored; nor allowed in the institution proper
unless authorized by the prison physician or warden.
All poisons will be kept in vaults provided for that
purpose; all drugs and medicines will be administered
under the direct supervision of an officer. Each officer
on all shifts must familiarize himself with instructions
concerning drugs to be administered as prescribed by
the prison physician.''
There is an apparent conflict in the wording of the statute
and the interpretation and regulation of the prison. It appears
14
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that a guard would be at his peril in any course of conduct
which he may take in the handling and dispensing of these
items.
In the recent case of State v. Packard, ____ Utah ____ , 250
P. 2d 561, the Utah Supreme Court in an excellent decision
very clearly sets forth the requirements of valid legislation
and consolidated a fairly complete list of authorities on the
question of uncertainty and vagueness in statutes. The Court
adopted, as it has a number of times, the principle set forth
in the case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S.
385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127, 70 L. Ed. 322, as follows:
" .. a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application violates the first essential of due
process of law . . . "
Justice Crockett, in State v. Packard, sets forth the tests
a statute must meet in order to be valid and wrote as follows:
"Concerning the question of uncertainty or vagueness of statutes, the authorities seem to be in accord
that the test a statute must meet to be valid is: It must
be sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding, what
their conduct must be to conform to its requirements;
(b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just
what constitutes the offense with which he is charged,
and (c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation and
application by those charged with responsibility of
applying and enforcing it."
The statutes in question here obviously do not meet the
tests concerning uncertainty and vagueness. In addition, these

15
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statutes are ambiguous, are inconsistent with other provisions
of the same chapter, and constitute an improper delegation of
legislative powers. Although the courts have gone a Jong way
in permitting a delegation of certain powers to an administrative agency, the courts have never permitted the delegation of
powers to any agency to prescribe rules and regulations, the
violation of which is a felony.

POINT NO. II
DOES PARTIAL INVALIDITY OF A CRIMINAL
STATUTE INVALIDATE THE WHOLE STATUTE, OR
MAY THE COURT ELIMINATE THOSE PROVISIONS
OF THE SECTION WHICH ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND LEAVE STANDING THAT PORTION OF A SECTION WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTITUTIONAL
IF ENACTED ALONE?
This issue was raised by the lower court at the time the
Motions to Quash and to Dismiss were argued. Judge Van Cott
reasoned that assuming the objections raised against Title 64-938, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, were for the most part valid
objections, could not the court eliminate the bad parts of the
section and make it read .. Any guard who violates any provision of this chapter is guilty of a felony." (R. 40 & 41). We
have argued and contended in the argument on Point I that
even that phrase is invalid as being indefinite and inconsistent
with other penalty provisions in other sections of the same
chapter. We urge, in addition, that if portions of a criminal
statute are invalid, that any attempt by the court to save a sole
16
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phrase of Section 38 would constitute a gross emasculation
of the section and would in effect be judicial legislation of a
criminal statute.
The sections under question are criminal sections m a
chapter primarily administrative dealing with the state prison.
Penal sections are to be construed strictly and in favor of the
accused and in favor of liberty. Sutherland in his text called
"Statutory Construction," in Chapter IX, deals with the issue
raised herein, to wit: Statutes void in part. The Court is expressly invited to read paragraph 172 therein dealing with
penal statutes. Mr. Sutherland expresses the law that statutes
of a civil nature within certain limitations are severable when
part is void and part is valid, "But the rule is more stringent
in regard to criminal statutes. As said by Johnson, J., in Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 427:
'Laws in relation to civil rights are sometimes held
to be unconstitutional, in so far as they affect the rights
of certain persons, and valid in respect to others. This
is done mainly upon the ground that the courts will
not construe them to relate to such cases as the legislature had not power to act upon. To statutes creating
criminal offenses, such a rule of construction ought
not to be applied, and I cannot find any trace of its
having been applied. It is of the highest importance to
the administration of criminal justice that acts creating
crimes should be certain in their terms and plain in
their application; and it would be in no small degree
unseemly that courts should be called upon, in administering the criminal law, to adjudge an act creating
offenses at one time valid, and at another time void.
It must, I think, stand as it has been enacted, or not
stand at all." '
17
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The United States Supreme Court has discussed this subject and the leading case concerning it is United States v.
Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563. Chief Justice Waite rendered the opinion and said as follows:
"We are, therefore, directly called upon to decide
whether a penal statute enacted by Congress, with its
limited powers, ·which is in general language broad
enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as
within the constitutional jurisdiction, can be limited
by judicial construction so as to make it operate only
on that which Congress may rightfully prohibit and
punish. For this purpose, we must take these sections
of the statute as they are. We are not able to reject a
part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder,
because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, because it is
not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional,
if there be any such, from that which is not. The proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or
disregarding words that are in the section, but by inserting those that are not now there. Each of the sections must stand as a whole, or fall altogether. The
language is plain. There is no room for construction,
unless it be as to the effect of the Constitution . . .
"It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say
who could be rightfully detained and who should be
set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the
judicial for the legislative department of the government . . . "
United States v. Reese is still followed by the United
States Supreme Court and one of the last cases is Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500, 70 L. Ed. 1059. In that case
18
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Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion and after citing United
States v. Reese and a. host of federal and state cases said:
"The effect of the authorities we have quoted is
clear to the point that we may not in a criminal statute
reduce its generally inclusive terms so as to limit its
application to only that class of cases which it was
within the power of the legislature to enact, and thus
save the statute from invalidity."
The United States v. Reese case has been followed in Utah
and has been quoted even though the cases under discussion
were civil in nature. United States v. Reese was quoted by
Judge Elias Hansen in a license tax case of North Tintic Mining
Company v. Crockett, 75 Utah 259, 284 Pac. 328. The Utah
Supreme Court has on one other occasion had an opportunity
to discuss the severability question involving a banking statute
in the case of Union Trust Company v. Simmons, 116 Utah
422, 211 Pac. 2d 190.
The Utah cases above cited deal with civil statutes which
within certain limitations and clear legislative intent may be
severable. In the case at hand, however, the question of severability deals with a criminal statute and any construction given
must be strict and in favor of the accused and of liberty. The
citations contained herein pertaining to criminal law clearly
establish that if part of a criminal section is void, the whole
section must fail. Such law is sound. A person should definitely
know the offense with which he is charged and not have it
left up to the courts to legislate statutory crimes.

19
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POINT NO. III
THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING AS REQUIRED BY LAW IN THAT
HE WAS NOT BOUND OVER ON THE CHARGE OF
ATTEMPTING TO GIVE OR SELL A DRUG TO AN INMATE OF THE STATE PRISON, WHILE A GUARD.
Apparently due to the vagueness, indefiniteness and uncertainty of the meaning and wording of the sections discussed
herein and in a frantic effort to find some charge which they
may stick against the defendant, the State has amended and
amended the Complaints and Informations filed· against the
defendant (R. 2, 7, 8 & 24). At the preliminary hearing the
defendant was finally bound over on the Amended Complaint
of ATTEMPTING TO SUPPLY DRUGS TO AN INMATE
(R. 3 & 7). The Amended Information now on file, to which
the defendant objected (R. 26), now charges the defendant
of ATTEMPTING TO GIVE OR SELL DRUGS TO AN
INMATE (R. 24).

It will be noted that defendant was bound over at the
preliminary hearing on an attempt TO SUPPLY drugs to an
inmate. He is presently charged with an attempt TO GIVE
OR SELL drugs to an inmate. This raises the question of
what is meant by give or sell. Is the word supply synonymous
with the word give or sell?

If the words give, sell and supply are interchangeable and
synonymous with each other, that adds impetus to the arguments set forth in Point No. I as to the uncertainty of meaning
of words give or sell in said section of the statute.
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If the word supply is different from the meaning of give
or sell, then the defendant has not had a preliminary hearing
on the present charge as provided by Title 77-15, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
This is a dilemma of which the defendant cannot afford
a satisfactory solution and serves to emphasize the points raised
in the argument of Point No. I.

CONCLUSION
The statutes under which the defendant is charged herein
have so many defects that a volume on statutory construction
could have been written fully discussing each word and phrase
of these sections. Because of the variety and great number of
defects in these sections, an attempt has been made herein to
only make a brief mention of the major defects present.
This is not a case where a single word or comma is indefinite or uncertain, but is a case where practically every
sentence and phrase is fraught with flagrant violations of good
and valid criminal legislation. The Court itself may well find
additional objections to these sections which are not even mentioned herein.
These sections are without a doubt a classic example of
how not to draft criminal legislation. The words and phrases
are vague, indefinite, ambiguous, uncertain, the penalty provided in the section dealing with the duties of guards and
keepers is inconsistent with other penalty provisions in the
chapter and the provisions dealing with delegation of powers
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amount to a complete usurpation of legislative authority in
making and defining crimes constituting a felony or misdemeanor.
It is readily apparent that the keepers, guards, employees,
warden and even the board of corrections· are continually violating the terms of these statutes by the improper application
or the lack of application of the provisions of this chapter.
The law is for all. The law must be such that all the
people can understand it. It must be of uniform application.
Power should never be placed in one department of government where the laws can be made, can be interpreted and
enforced, all at the same time. Such a situation is wholly repugnant to the spirit, intent and wording of the constitutions
of the state and nation.
Respectfully submitted,
DAHL AND SAGERS
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

EVERETT E. DAHL
VICTOR G. SAGERS
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